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You load sixteen tons, and what do you get?
Another day older and deeper in debt.
Saint Peter, don't you call me, 'cause I can't go;
I owe my soul to the company store .... 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Easy money! Fast cash! No credit check required! Payday
and title loans are a booming business, as the growing numbers of
brightly colored shops attest. However, darker stories of financial
devastation and unanswered questions hide behind the circus-like
storefronts and catchy jingles. One question in particular demands an answer: are the loans a lifesaver for the borrowers who
use them, or the straw that breaks their financial backs? The answer, of course, depends on whom you ask. The lenders tout
themselves as benevolent friends to borrowers in need. Consumer
advocates claim the lenders are wolves in sheep's clothing.
One thing is clear. While payday and title loans may indeed
provide much-needed cash quickly, it is far from certain that they
constitute easy money. Instead, the loans have several features
that characterize them as "predatory," including extremely high
interest rates, miniscule repayment times, little or no consideration of borrowers' abilities to repay the loan (underwriting), and
requirement of one single "balloon" payment at the loan's end.
Mounting evidence confirms that these features undermine borrowers' financial stability, which in turn increases demands on social service agencies, public assistance programs, and, ultimately,
the taxpayer. 2 Any fleeting benefit to borrowers quickly becomes
a collective burden on the community and the state.
Consumer advocates across the country have responded by
developing alternative loan programs, providing financial education, and raising public awareness about the dangers of payday
and title loans. However, borrowers will continue to struggle with
the loans' triple-digit interest rates and extremely short repayment terms until lawmakers fortify the existing payday and title
loan laws with adequate consumer protections.
Part II of this Comment presents a short history and overview
of payday and title lending in Montana and nationally. Part III
explains the current Montana Deferred Deposit Lending Act 3 and
1. Tennessee Ernie Ford, Sixteen Tons (Capitol 1955) (78 rpm L.P.).
2. Infra nn. 116-23 and accompanying text.
3. Mont. Code Ann. § 31-1-7 (2005).
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Montana Title Loan Act, 4 and federal regulations applicable to
state consumer protection efforts. Part IV outlines the ongoing
battle between these lenders and consumer advocates, both of
whom claim to have the best interests of consumers at heart. Part
V provides specific recommendations as to how Montana's laws
can better protect consumers from the potential abuses of payday
and title loans.

II.

SOME THINGS NEVER CHANGE:

A

BRIEF HISTORY OF

PAYDAY AND TITLE LENDING

When it comes to payday and title loans, this isn't exactly the
nation's first rodeo. The loans are a modern take on nearly identical high-interest, short-term loans that existed in various forms at
the beginning of the twentieth century. 5 "Salary lenders" and
"wage buyers" bought workers' upcoming wages at discounted
rates-"five for six boys," for example, paid borrowers five dollars
in exchange for repayment of six.6 Other lenders offered to "buy"
a borrower's vehicle and then "lease" it back to him, with repossession as the penalty for missing a lease payment. 7 The worst of the
lenders charged triple-digit interest rates, and society labeled
8
them "loan sharks."
The first loan sharks sparked judicial scrutiny, public outrage, and legislative condemnation. At first, the lenders insisted
the transactions were not loans and were thus outside the reach of
usury laws, an argument echoed by their modern counterparts. 9
However, in determining whether a transaction is a loan subject
to usury laws, courts have long followed a judicial principle of sub4. Mont. Code Ann. § 31-1-8.
5. Paul Chessin, Borrowing from Peter to Pay Paul: A StatisticalAnalysis of Colorado's Deferred Deposit Loan Act, 83 Denv. U. L. Rev. 387, 391 (2005); Lynn Drysdale &
Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer FinancialServices Marketplace: The Fringe
Banking System and Its Challenge to Current Thinking about the Role of Usury Laws in
Today's Society, 51 S.C. L. Rev. 589, 618-20 (2000); Elizabeth Renuart & Kathleen E.
Keest, The Cost of Credit: Regulation, Preemption, and Industry Abuses § 2.5, 39 (3d ed.,
Natl. Consumer L. Ctr. 2005); Charles A. Bruch, Student Author, Taking the Pay out of
Payday Loans: Puttingan End to the Usurious and UnconscionableInterest Rates Charged
by Payday Lenders, 69 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1257, 1268, 1270 (2000-2001); Lisa Blaylock Moss,
Modern Day Loan Sharking:DeferredPresentment Transactions& the Need for Regulation,
51 Ala. L. Rev. 1725, 1731 (2000).
6. Drysdale & Keest, supra n. 5, at 618; Bruch, supra n. 5, at 1267; Renuart & Keest,
supra n. 5, at § 7.5.5.1, 292.
7. Drysdale & Keest, supra n. 5, at 619.
8. Id. at 620.
9. Chessin, supra n. 5, at 392; Bruch, supra n. 5, at 1268.
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stance over form,' 0 with the aim to prevent "the betrayal ofjustice
by the cloak of words, the contrivances of form, or the paper tigers
of the crafty."" Thus, the courts frequently saw through the lenders' facades and recognized the transactions as usurious loans.' 2
Social service agencies, legal aid organizations, and labor unions countered the lending practices with charitable alternatives
and public awareness campaigns.' 3 The Russell Sage Foundation,
a philanthropic foundation devoted to research and improvement
of social and living conditions, developed the first small-loan laws,
and in 1916, the first draft of a Model Uniform Small Loan Act
was issued.' 4 It recommended states rein in the small-loan industry by allowing a "high rate of return"-eventually fixed at 36%
for small loans of $300 or less-in exchange for increased regulation. 15 By 1930, every state but Arkansas had enacted small-loan
laws, and the majority had adopted some version of the Model
Act. 16 Arkansas had already gone one step further: since 1874,
the Arkansas State Constitution has contained specific usury provisions prohibiting lenders from charging interest of more than
17% per year on consumer loans.' 7 While the new laws allowed
legitimate lenders to continue offering small loans at the lower
interest rates, the laws branded the high-interest transactions as
loans subject to state usury laws, and effectively drove the "loan
sharks" out of business for several decades.' 8
In the 1980s, however, deregulation of the banking sector
spurred traditional financial institutions to flee the small-loan
market in favor of larger loans that cost the bank the same
amount to make, but provide much greater returns. 19 At the same
time, credit cards emerged as the primary source of personal
credit for mainstream America. 20 Consumers who could not ob10. Drysdale & Keest, supra n. 5, at 637; Moss, supra n. 5, at 1744.
11. Wilcox v.Moore, 93 N.W.2d 288, 291 (Mich. 1958) (holding that courts must "look
squarely at the real nature of the transaction").
12. Chessin, supra n. 5, at 392 n. 21.
13. Renuart & Keest, supra n. 5, at 38; Drysdale & Keest, supra n. 5, at 620; John
Kilgore, Organizationof Public Opinion for Effective Measures againstLoan Sharks, 8 L. &
Contemp. Probs. 173, 182 (1941).
14. Renuart & Keest, supra n. 5, at 16; Drysdale & Keest, supra n. 5, at 621.
15. Drysdale & Keest, supra n. 5, at 621.
16. Id.
17. Ark. Const. art. XIX, § 13(b).
18. Drysdale & Keest, supra n. 5, at 621.
19. Id. at 624-25; Pearl Chin, Payday Loans: The Case for FederalLegislation, U. Ill. L.
Rev. 723, 727 (2004).
20. Drysdale & Keest, supra n. 5, at 625.
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tain credit cards because of insufficient income or poor credit his21
tory were left to fend for themselves.
By the early 1990s, entrepreneurs smelled untapped profits
in the dormant small-loan industry, 2 2 and by 2000, over 10,000
payday lenders had opened their doors. 23 They skirted usury laws
by calling themselves "check-cashers" who merely deferred depositing the customer's check. 24 As state banking regulators began
deciding the transactions were actually usurious loans, the payday and title loan industries worked overtime through the 1990s
25
to convince state legislatures to exempt them from usury laws.
Currently, thirty-six states have enacted laws specifically permitting payday lenders. 2 6 Data regarding current state title loan
laws are less widely available, but based on information available
from state banking regulators in mid-2006, the author estimated
fifteen states expressly prohibited title loans, twelve had no statutes yet either prohibiting or capping the loans, seventeen capped
title loans at an annual percentage rate (APR) less than 100%
(generally 36% or less), and six states (including Montana) had
passed specific title loan acts allowing fees of 200% to 300%
APR. 2 7 Montana law exempts both payday and title lenders from
21. Id.; Chin, supra n. 19, at 727.
22. Bruch, supra n. 5, at 1270.
23. Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 Yale J. on Reg. 121, 149-50 (2004) (estimating that payday loan industry revenue exceeds $2 billion annually).
24. Chessin, supra n. 5, at 392.
25. Drysdale & Keest, supra n. 5, at 653-54; Amanda Quester & Jean Ann Fox, Car
Title Lending: Driving Borrowers to FinancialRuin 10 (Ctr. for Responsible Lending/Consumer Fed. of Am. (CFA 2005).
26. Those states are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. Uriah King, Leslie Parrish & Ozlem Tanik,
FinancialQuicksand:Payday Lending Sinks Borrowers in Debt with $4.2 Billion in Predatory Fees Every Year 25 n. 5 (CFA 2006).
27. The following states prohibit title lending: Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. The following states have not enacted a title
loan act and regulate any title lending under a small loan or other consumer loan act:
Delaware, Idaho, Kansas, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, South
Dakota, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. The following states have a fee cap that limits title
lenders to charging less than 100% APR, either under a title loan, consumer loan, or usury
statute: Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Texas, and Vermont. The following states have enacted title loan acts permitting
title loan fees exceeding 200%: Arizona and Tennessee (204% to 264%); Alabama, Georgia,
Mississippi, and Montana (300%).
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usury laws, and allows fees at the highest level enacted by any
28
state in the country.
By 2001, a Consumer Federation of America (CFA) survey estimated that payday lenders alone were making about 65 million
loans per year, with loan revenues exceeding $2 billion. 29 Today
around 22,000 payday lenders extend around $40 billion in loans
per year, and it is estimated that over 15,000 title lenders operate
in the United States. 30 Only recently has the industry's growth
begun to level off as the market has become saturated with competitors, which are increasingly associated with national chains
31
and online lending.

III.

Is

THAT LEGAL? THE LANDSCAPE OF PAYDAY AND
TITLE LENDING IN MONTANA

A.

Background

When the Montana State Legislature enacted the Deferred
Deposit Lending Act in 1999 and the Title Loan Act in 2001, legislators probably believed they were doing consumers a favor. Prior
to state regulation, payday and title lenders operated outside the
reach of usury laws by characterizing their schemes as checkcashing rather than lending transactions. 3 2 A better law seemed
necessary.
Around this time, consumer advocates and the lending industry were quickly forming opposing camps, and each proposed its
own version of model legislation. In 1998, the CFA and the National Consumer Law Center (NCLC) released model payday loan
legislation that included consumer protection features like a 36%
annual interest rate cap and two weeks of repayment time for
every $50 of principal borrowed. 33 In early 2000, the Community
Financial Services Association of America (CFSA), a payday loan
28. Infra n. 84.
29. Jean Ann Fox & Edmund Mierzwinski, Rent-a-Bank Payday Lending: How Banks
Help Payday Lenders Evade State Consumer Protections 4 (CFA/Pub. Interest Research
Group 2001).
30. Community Fin. Serv. Assn. of Am. (CFSA), About Payday Advance, httpJ/www.
cfsa.netlaboutpayday-advance.html (accessed Feb. 23, 2007); Bankrate.com, Car Title
Lending: Short-Term Fix with Long-Term Expense, http://www.careprogram.us/pdfs/predatory/CarTitlePredatoryLending.pdf (Nov. 1, 2006).
31. Quester & Fox, supra n. 25, at 9-10.
32. Chessin, supra n. 5, at 392.
33. Model Deferred Deposit Loan Act §§ 6(a), 8(b) (NCLC & CFA 1998) (available at
http://www.consumerlaw.org/initiatives/paydayloans/paydayac.shtml).
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trade association, unveiled its "model law," which recommended a
fee of 20% of the loan amount, not to be "deemed interest for any
purpose of law." 34 (The proposed 20% fee, in the context of a twoweek payday loan, amounts to an APR of 520%.)
The Montana Legislature enacted payday and title lending
laws that more closely resemble the industry's model legislation
than legislation encouraged by consumer advocates. The acts
"capped" fees, but at 25% of the loan value, 35 exceeding even the
maximum fees proposed by the industry. Montana's cap is the
highest allowed in the nation, equating to an APR of 300% for a
thirty-day title loan and 650% for a two-week payday loan. With
little data available regarding rates charged by lenders prior to
the laws' enactment, it is not clear whether the new laws actually
capped the fees or merely codified them.
In addition, the acts mandated short repayment terms because the industry claimed this would prevent the loans from being misused as long-term credit options. 36 Consumer advocates
argue that the industry skillfully presented one of the riskiest features of the loans, their extremely short repayment terms, as a
"consumer protection" provision.3 7
B.

The Montana Deferred Deposit Loan Act

Most discussions of payday and title loans begin with and
center around payday loans, and this Comment will do the same.
The controversy surrounding payday loans tends to overshadow
that of title loans, because payday loans tend to be discussed first
and in more depth. While some consumer advocates believe payday loans pose a higher risk of trapping borrowers in a cycle of
debt, 38 this Comment argues in the next section that title loans'
34. Deferred Presentment Services Act § 113(q) (CFSA 2000) (proposed model legislation). Consumer advocates argue that regardless of whether the finance charge is characterized as interest, the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA) clearly requires disclosure of
all finance charges as an APR. Infra nn. 92-93.
35. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 31-1-722(2), -817(1)(a) (2005).
36. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 31-1-715(1), -803(8) (prohibiting terms longer than thirty-one
days for payday loans and thirty days for title loans).
37. Jean Ann Fox, Payday Lenders Shred Consumer Safety Net, CFA (press release,
Oct. 3, 2002) (available at http://www.consumerfed.org/releases2.cfm?filename=100302payloans-shrednet.txt); Ltr. from Jean Ann Fox, CFA, to Congress, Regulate Payday Lenders 2 (Oct. 2, 2002) (available at httpJ/www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/paydayletterl00802.pdf).
38. Bruch, supra n. 5, at 1273 (suggesting title loan borrowers do not get trapped in a
cycle of debt and can simply "walk away" from their vehicles, whereas payday loan borrowers face more serious consequences).
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potential for wreaking financial devastation can equal or exceed
that of payday loans.
In Montana, payday lenders achieved legislative approval
first-the payday loan act was enacted in 1999, the title loan act
in 2001. 39 Payday lenders are also more prolific-116 payday
lenders are currently licensed to operate in Montana, compared to
40
forty-two title lenders.
Finally, the provisions of the payday loan act are much more
extensive, and many general provisions reappear in the title loan
act. In fact, many commentators consider title loans simply a variation on the payday loan scheme. 4 1 Thus, an introduction to the
payday loan act serves as an introduction to the title loan act as
well.
In 1999, the Montana Legislature enacted the Deferred Deposit Lending Act (DDLA), authorizing a short-term, high-interest
42
loan that has come to be commonly known as the payday loan.
The DDLA states that its purpose is to "protect consumers who
enter into short-term, high-rate loans with lenders from abuses
that occur in the credit marketplace when the lenders are unregulated."4 3 Ironically, a closer look at its provisions raises the question whether it protects consumers from abuses now that lenders
are regulated. The DDLA defines a deferred deposit loan as
an arrangement, including all representations made by the deferred
deposit lender whether express or implied, in which:
(a) a person accepts a check dated on the date on which the
check is written and agrees to hold the check for a period of days
prior to deposit or presentment;
(b) a person accepts a check dated subsequent to the date on
which the check is written and agrees to hold the check for deposit
or presentment until the date written on the check; or
(c) a person accepts written authorization from a consumer to
electronically deduct from the consumer's account on a specific date
the amount of the loan and fees that are authorized under this
part.4 4

The Federal Reserve Board similarly defines a payday loan as a
credit transaction
39. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 31-1-701, -801.
40. E-mail from Christopher Romano, Mont. Div. of Banking and Fin. Instn., to Author
(Sept. 19, 2006) (copy on file with Montana Law Review).
41. E.g. Barr, supra n. 23, at 164.
42. Mont. Code Ann. § 31-1-7.
43. Mont. Code Ann. § 31-1-702(1).
44. Mont. Code Ann. § 31-1-703(5).
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in which a cash advance is made to a consumer in exchange for the
consumer's personal check, or in exchange for the consumer's authorization to debit the consumer's deposit account, and where the
parties agree either that the check45will not be cashed or deposited
... until

a designated future date.

For a consumer, the key factors in any loan are its principal,
repayment term, and finance charge. The DDLA authorizes a licensed payday lender to provide loans of up to $300 in principal,
not including the loan fee. 46 While relatively small in amount, a
payday loan also has a very short repayment term, which cannot
exceed thirty-one days. 47 However, payday lenders frequently use
an average loan term of only fifteen days. 48 This ostensibly allows
the borrower to repay the loan with his or her next paycheck
(hence the name "payday loan").
A payday lender may charge a "loan fee" of up to 25% of the
loan principal, or $75 for a $300 loan. 4 9 The fee percentage is the
same regardless of whether the loan term is seven days or thirtyone days. For a typical two-week loan, the allowable finance
charge translates to an APR of 650%.
When the loan is due, the borrower has two options. She can
pay it off, or she can allow the lender to present the check or electronic debit against her checking account for payment. If she has
the funds to pay off the loan, either in hand or in the bank, the
options are equivalent.
If she does not have the money to pay off the loan, or perhaps
has some money but needs it to pay some other expense, she faces
a more difficult choice. If she does not repay the loan, the lender
will present the check or debit for payment, and may charge a
non-sufficient funds fee of $30.50 Of course, the financial institution may also charge its own fee, and possibly close the borrower's
checking account. If, after several attempts, the lender is unable
to obtain payment through the check, it can then seek repayment
45. 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. I § 226.2(a)(14)(2) (2005). This is Federal Reserve Board
Regulation Z, which implements TILA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-77 (2005). See 12 C.F.R.
§ 226. l(a). Supplement I consists of the Official Staff Commentary of the Federal Reserve
Board, interpreting TILA and Regulation Z. 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. I § 1.
46. Mont. Code Ann. § 31-1-715(2). For a licensing fee of $375, and a $125 annual
renewal fee, one may become a licensed payday lender. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 31-1-705(2),
-706(1).
47. Mont. Code Ann. § 31-1-715(1).
48. Chessin, supra n. 5, at 406.
49. Mont. Code Ann. § 31-1-722(2).
50. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 31-1-722(3), -722(4).
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through a collection agency or a court judgment, adding collection
51
and legal fees to the borrower's growing tab.
Alternatively, the borrower can "rob Peter to pay Paul." For
example, she can pay off the loan with money earmarked for rent,
then turn around and take out another payday loan to pay the
rent. Montana law specifically prohibits "roll-overs" or any pay5 2
ment of existing payday loans with proceeds of a new loan.
However, lenders have thus far managed to skirt the law with
back-to-back transactions that exact the same high cost from the
borrower.
C.

The Montana Title Loan Act

In 2001, two years after authorizing payday lending, the Mon53
tana Legislature enacted the Montana Title Loan Act (TLA),
permitting a second form of high-interest, short-term loan. The
TLA defines a title loan as "a loan secured by an unencumbered
state-issued certificate of title or certificate of ownership to per54
sonal property, with an original term of 30 days."
The TLA also purports to protect consumers. 55 Yet, like payday loans, title loans require no underwriting and allow tripledigit APRs. 5 6 Like payday lenders, title lenders may also charge a
monthly finance fee of up to 25% of the loan amount, at least for
the first $2,000 loaned; higher amounts are subject to slightly reduced rates.5 7 Whereas payday lenders frequently elect to use a
shorter term of around fifteen days, title loans generally use a
thirty-day term, which is the maximum allowed by law. 58 Based
on this thirty-day term, a title lender may charge an APR of over
51. Mont. Code Ann. § 31-1-722(5).
52. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 31-1-723(6), -722(13), -722(15).
53. Mont. Code Ann. § 31-1-801.
54. Mont. Code Ann. § 31-1-803(8).
55. Mont. Code Ann. § 31-1-802 ("The purpose of this part is to protect consumers who
enter into short-term, high-rate loans with lenders from abuses that occur in the credit
marketplace when the lenders are unregulated.").
56. Quester & Fox, supra n. 25, at 4-6.
57. Mont. Code Ann. § 31-1-817(a). Any portion of a loan over $2,000 but less than
$4,000 is subject to 18% interest per thirty-day period, which is equivalent to an APR of
216%. Any portion of a title loan over $4,000 is subject to 10% interest per thirty-day period, which is equivalent to an APR of 120%. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 31-1-817(b), -817(c).
58. Mont. Code. Ann. § 31-1-803(8). As noted above, the industry argues that the short
term is necessary to "protect" borrowers from abusing the loans, which are only intended to
provide a short-term form of credit. Otherwise, the loans' expensive finance charges would
begin to look more like the triple-digit interest rates consumer advocates argue they are.
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300%.5 9 Although the statute sets no limit on the amount a title
lender may lend, 60 national studies suggest most title lenders
stick to a conservative percentage of the securing vehicle's value,
often one-third, in order to ensure sufficient collateral should the
61
borrower default.
Title loans can be every bit as disastrous as payday loans.
The borrower risks losing a vehicle that he owned free and clear,
and transportation he may need for his employment. 6 2 As with
payday loans, the short repayment term and lack of underwriting
used in title loans increase the likelihood that a borrower will be
unable to repay a title loan when it is due. 6 3 As the repayment
term of a title loan cannot exceed thirty days regardless of the
amount borrowed or the borrower's income, 64 a borrower who
earns $2,000 per month could receive a title loan of $500 or more
65
with full payment due in one month.
With uncanny foresight toward just such a predicament, the
TLA allows for up to five "renewals" on a title loan in which a
customer is required to pay another finance charge but not any
part of the principal. 6 6 In exchange, he is given an extension of
one more month for each additional finance charge paid. 6 7 Thus, a
title loan can essentially be an "interest-only" loan for up to six
months. Beginning with the sixth renewal, either the customer
must pay at least 10% of the principal per month, or the lender
must reduce the amount of principal each month by 10% of the
original principal, solely for the purpose of calculating the finance
68
charge.
A hypothetical more clearly illustrates the long-term possibilities of a title loan (see Table 1). A borrower who borrows
$2,000 on January 1, 2007, may be charged a finance fee of 25% of
the principal, or $500. If she cannot repay the $2,000 by February
59. Approximate APR based on a 25% finance fee per thirty-day term, multiplied by
twelve terms per year. Because there are actually 12.17 thirty-day terms in a 365-day
year, the exact maximum APR is 304.17%.
60. Mont. Code Ann. § 31-1-817(c).
61. Barr, supra n. 23, at 164; Quester & Fox, supra n. 25, at 5.
62. Quester & Fox, supra n. 25, at 8.
63. Barr, supra n. 23, at 166; Quester & Fox, supra n. 25, at 6.
64. Mont. Code Ann. § 31-1-803(8).
65. An Illinois survey found the average annual salary of title loan borrowers was less
than $20,000. Ill. Dept. of Fin. Instn., Short Term Lending: FinalReport 26 (1999) (available at http'//www.state.il.us/dfi/ccd/pdfs/Shortterm.pdf).
66. Mont. Code Ann. § 31-1-816(2)(d)(i).
67. Id.
68. Mont. Code Ann. § 31-1-816(2)(d)(i)-(ii).
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1, she can renew the loan by paying another month's finance fee,
or another $500. Of course, any renewal is solely at the option of
the lender, who may instead demand payment in full. 69 However,
it clearly serves the lender's financial interest to allow the renewal: if the borrower renews five times (February through June)
as allowed by statute, she will have paid $3,000 in finance fees
(including the first month's finance charge), and still owe the entire principal.
On July 1, 2007, the lender must begin reducing the principal
each month by 10% of the original principal, or $200, when calculating the interest (although the entire principal amount is still
owed by the borrower). What if the borrower can only pay the required interest payment? Ten months later, in April of 2008, the
borrower will have paid a total of $5,250 in finance fees over a
period of sixteen months. The borrower will also still owe $2,000,
the principal amount of the original loan.
Finally, the TLA also contains a provision specifying it does
not apply to pawnbrokers. 70 The title lending industry interprets
this provision to mean that a title lender may call itself a pawn
shop or title pawn and escape regulation under the TLA. 7 1 Consumer advocates argue that the exemption clearly applies only to
traditional pawn transactions in which the pawned vehicle is left
72
in the possession of the pawnbroker.
D. But What about the Usury Law?
For over 5,000 years, since the earliest recorded credit transactions, society has been concerned with lenders charging interest
rates it perceives as too high. 7 3 The first major codification of Roman law capped interest rates at about 8% per year, which was
69. Id.
[LIender may renew the title loan ... if the borrower fails to reduce the principal
amount as required by subsection (2)(d)(i), the title lender may at its option: (A)

declare outstanding principal and any finance charges due and payable; or (B)
solely for the purpose of calculating the finance charge, reduce the amount of the
principal balance by 10%, with the understanding that that portion of the principal is still owed by the borrower but that portion of the loan may not accrue interest or finance charges after that date ....
Id. (emphasis added).
70. Mont. Code Ann. § 31-1-802(3).
71. Barr, supra n. 23, at 165 (title lenders claim advantages under pawnbroker laws
despite differences between the loans).
72. Id.
73. Renuart & Keest, supra n. 5, at 42.
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TABLE 1
Month Renewal

Principal Owed

Principal for Purpose of Finance
Calculating Interest
Fee Paid

1

0

$2,000

$2,000

$500

2

1

$2,000

$2,000

$500

3

2

$2,000

$2,000

$500

4

3

$2,000

$2,000

$500

5

4

$2,000

$2,000

$500

6

5

$2,000

$2,000

$500

7

6

$2,000

$1,800

$450

8

7

$2,000

$1,600

$400

9

8

$2,000

$1,400

$350

10

9

$2,000

$1,200

$300

11

10

$2,000

$1,000

$250

12

11

$2,000

$800

$200

13

12

$2,000

$600

$150

14

13

$2,000

$400

$100

15

14

$2,000

$200

$50

16

15

-0-

-0-

At 16 months:

$2,000
Principal Owed: $2,000

Total Finance Fees Paid: $5,250

raised to 12% about 400 years later, in 88 B.C.E. 7 4 Blackstone
explained
[Iun calculating the rate of interest, the Romans divided the principal sum into a hundred parts, one of which they allowed to be taken
monthly; and this, which was the highest rate of interest permitted,
they 5called usurae centesimae, amounting yearly to twelve per
cent.

7

This rate remained in effect for centuries and was adopted by
the later Roman Empire and the Byzantine Empire in Constantinople.7 6 Blackstone later wrote of England's usury statute permitting interest of 5% per year, and commented that
74. Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding,and High-Cost Consumer Credit:
The Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 Fla. L. Rev. 807, 823-24 (2003);
Sidney Homer & Richard Sylla, A Historyof Interest Rates 47 (3d rev. ed., Rutgers U. Press
1996). Interestingly, this codification, called the Twelve Tables, was a response at least in
part to a rebellion in 494 B.C.E. known as the First Secession, which historians attribute
primarily to a debt crisis. Chester G. Starr, Jr., The Emergence of Rome as Ruler of the
Western World 23 (2d ed., Cornell U. Press 1953); T. J. Cornell, The Beginning of Rome:
Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000-264 BC) 257 (Routledge
1995).
75. William Blackstone, Commentaries vol. 2, *373 n. m.
76. Homer & Sylla, supra n. 74, at 47, 49.
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Irish, American, Turkish, and Indian interest, have been allowed in
our courts to the amount of even twelve per cent: for the moderation
or exorbitance of interest depends upon local circumstances; and the
refusal 7to enforce such contracts would put a stop to all foreign
7
trade.

Thus, an annual interest rate of 12% (modest compared to today's
consumer lending rates) was viewed as a necessary evil enforced
only to maintain foreign trade. The early American colonies followed suit, enacting interest rate caps from 4% to 10%. 7 8 Today,
Congress defines usury as the charging of an interest rate greater
79
than that allowed by statute.
Upon hearing an explanation of Montana's payday and title
lending laws, the public generally asks two questions: "Is that legal?"and, after the affirmative answer, "But what about the usury
law?" As many Montanans are aware, state usury law prohibits a
lender from charging an interest rate above 10% per year.8 0 However, few realize it contains two loopholes so sizeable as to render
it largely irrelevant in the context of consumer lending.
First, it allows parties to circumvent the law and agree to an
interest rate up to "15% or an amount that is 6 percentage points
per annum above the prime rate of major New York banks," so
long as they do so in writing.8 The second exception specifically
82
prohibits application of the usury rate to "regulated lenders."
Regulated lenders include banks, credit unions, savings and loan
companies-any entity engaged in the business of lending.8 3
When the Montana Legislature enacted the DDLA and the
TLA, payday lenders and title lenders became regulated lenders
exempt from state usury statutes.8 4 The Montana Department of
Administration's Division of Banking and Financial Institutions
(Division of Banking) licenses, examines, and oversees the lenders,8 5 and the legislature sets the rates of interest regulated lenders may charge. Thus, the disappointing yet inevitable conclusion
is that the usury statute applies only to non-commercial lenders
and provides no protection when it comes to regulated lenders like
payday and title lenders.
77. Blackstone, supra n. 75, at *374.
78. Peterson, supra n. 74, at 844.
79. 12 U.S.C. § 86 (2000).
80. Mont. Code Ann. § 31-1-106 (2005).
81. Mont. Code Ann. § 31-1-107(1).
82. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 31-1-107(3), -112(1).
83. Mont. Code Ann. § 31-1-111(1).
84. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 31-1-702(2), -802(2).
85. Id.
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FederalRegulations Affecting Payday and Title Lending

To date, Congress has not passed any comprehensive laws
regulating payday and title lenders, leaving states scrambling to
piece together regulatory frameworks.8 6 Nonetheless, federal legislation and regulation have significantly impacted state consumer protection efforts regarding these lenders. Three examples
are critical in understanding the current regulatory scheme: the
federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA), oversight attempts by the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and Congress's
recent move to protect military personnel from predatory payday
and title loans.
1.

The Truth in Lending Act

Congress originally enacted TILA in 1968 as part of the Consumer Protection Act.8 7 TILA's purpose is "to assure a meaningful
disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and
avoid the uninformed use of credit," and to protect the consumer
88
against inaccurate and unfair credit billing.
The Federal Reserve Board has implemented TILA's consumer credit provisions through Regulation Z, which instructs
lenders regarding compliance with TILA.8 9 Regulation Z applies
to any individual or business that regularly offers personal, family
or household credit to consumers for a finance charge.9 0 Regulation Z further provides examples of charges that are to be included
in calculating a finance charge, including any interest, service or
carrying charge, loan fee, or similar charge. 9 1
Because payday and title lenders meet these criteria, the regulation requires that they disclose certain information to their
borrowers, including the lender's identity, the amount financed,

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Chin, supra n. 19, at 725.
Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968).
Id. at § 102(a).
12 C.F.R. § 226 (2006).
Id. at § 226.1(c).
Id. at § 226.4(b).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2007

15

Montana Law Review, Vol. 68 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 9

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 68

the finance charge, and the APR. 9 2 Courts have generally agreed
93
that TILA applies to payday and title loans.
Under Regulation Z, creditors must make disclosures "clearly
and conspicuously in writing, in a form that the consumer may
keep." 9 4 The regulation requires that disclosures "shall be
grouped together, shall be segregated from everything else, and
shall not contain any information not directly related to the disclosures required under § 226.18." 9 5 Finally, "[tihe terms 'finance
charge' and '[APR]'. . . shall be more conspicuous than any other
96
disclosure, except the creditor's identity under § 226.18(a)."
2. Interest Rate Exportation
The National Bank Act allows a national bank to "export" the
interest rate permitted by its home state to any other state where
it does business, preempting the other state's laws restricting interest.9 7 Likewise, federally insured depositories claim a similar
right to export interest rates regardless of individual states' consumer protection laws, 98 because the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act requires that those depositories (including state-chartered institutions) participate on a "level
playing field" with national banks. 99
The OCC has not officially preempted the field of regulating
national banks' lending activities. However, it has "asserted a virtually unlimited power to override state laws" so that banks may
operate unfettered by state restrictions. 10 0 The OCC's rules of
92. Id. at § 226.18. Whether the lenders actually give the disclosure is a different issue. One national study found that less than one third of payday lenders provided an even
approximately accurate APR disclosure on charts or brochures, and only 21% provided a
verbal APR disclosure upon a customer's request. Fox & Mierzwinski, supra n. 29, at 14.
93. E.g. Yarnall v.Four Aces Emporium, Inc., 322 B.R. 422, 426 (Bankr. App. 9th Cir.
2005).
94. 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(a)(1) (2005) (Regulation Z).
95. Id.
96. Id. at (a)(2).
97. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001(b); 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2000) (defining permissible rate of interest as
that allowed in the state where a bank is "located"); Marquette Natl. Bank v. First of
Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 301 (1978) (holding that a bank may "export" the usury
law of the state in which it is headquartered to customers in another state where it does
business).
98. Drysdale & Keest, supra n. 5, at 646.
99. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1831d (2000).
100. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg.
1904, 1908 (Jan. 7, 2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7, 34); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The
OCC'sPreemption Rules Exceed the Agency's Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the
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preemption override any state law that applies to a national bank
or its subsidiaries, unless Congress has expressly incorporated a
state law standard into a federal statute, or the state law is of a
general nature, like contract, tort, or criminal law. 10 1 This farreaching view of the OCC's authority has been criticized as contradictory to Supreme Court jurisprudence, Congressional policy intended to maintain a competitive balance between state and national banks, and the doctrine of sovereign state power set forth in
10 2
the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
When payday lenders began partnering with national banks
in order to gain the protection of these federal laws, consumer advocates were highly concerned with what they viewed as a "rent-abank" lending scheme. 10 3 When the OCC declared in 2003 that it
completely preempted Georgia's application of state predatory
mortgage lending laws to national banks operating in the state,
consumer advocates feared the OCC would extend similar protection to the payday and title lending partnerships with banks. Instead, the OCC began issuing warnings to national banks to cease
partnering with payday and title lenders, or face heightened scrutiny and possible penalties. 10 4 National banks have had little
choice but to ease out of the payday and title lending industry,
although states' hands may remain tied with regard to predatory
mortgage lending.
3.

Military Personnel Exemption

In a partial victory for consumer advocates, Congress recently
acted to protect military personnel from high-interest payday and
title loans by including a 36% APR cap and other consumer protection provisions in the Department of Defense authorization bill for
fiscal year 2007.105 In addition to the cap, the bill bans mandatory
arbitration clauses, prepayment penalties, and lenders' use of service members' checks as security for loans.' 0 6 Congress approved
the protections in response to Pentagon concerns that the loans
Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 Annual Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 225,
234 (2004).
101. Wilmarth, supra n. 100, at 235.
102. See generally id.
103. Fox & Mierzwinski, supra n. 29, at 3.
104. Id. at 18-19; e.g. In re FirstNatl. Bank in Brookings, OCC Consent Order No. 20031 (Jan. 17, 2003); In re Peoples Natl. Bank, OCC Consent Order No. 2003-2 (Jan. 30, 2003);
In re Advance Am., OCC Consent Order No. 2003-3 (Jan. 24, 2003).
105. Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 670 (Sept. 30, 2006).
106. Id.
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targeted young, financially vulnerable military personnel, and affected military readiness by hampering security clearances and
10 7
hurting morale.
These provisions are not new ideas but have been promoted
by consumer advocates for years to protect all consumers from the
most predatory features of payday loans. It remains to be seen
whether the concerns that spurred this federal legislation will result in extension of the same protections to all consumers. In
many states, military personnel and their families are among the
most financially vulnerable citizens.1 0 8 In Montana, where the
median household income hovers at around 80% of that earned
nationally, 0 9 civilian households struggle alongside their enlisted
neighbors to get by from month to month.
To date, Congress has stepped in to protect only military families, in recognition of the great sacrifices and financial pressures
they face. In Montana, we now face the question whether we want
lending practices that Congress has condemned as abusive to military personnel to continue for teachers, nurses, construction workers, and the rest of Montana's citizens.
IV.

REINING IN HIGH-COST PAYDAY AND TITLE
LENDING IN MONTANA

Consumer advocates and lenders agree on one thing: payday
and title loans are in high demand, as evidenced by the explosion
of payday and title lending businesses since their legalization in
several states. 0 However, when the conversation turns to regulating the loans, advocates and lenders rarely see eye to eye.
Lenders characterize consumer protection efforts as paternalistic
and meddling, claiming consumers should be free to choose their
own financial products."" Consumer advocates counter that the
loans are designed to trap borrowers in a cycle of debt, and can be
107. MSNBC, Congress to Limit Interest Rates for Payday Loans: Measure Intended to
Protect Military Families from Predatory Lenders, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
15062520/ (posted Sept. 29, 2006).
108. Steve Tripoli & Amy Mix, In Harm's Way-At Home: Consumer Scams and the Direct Targeting of America's Military and Veterans 8 (NCLC 2003) (estimating that nearly
75% of all active-duty military personnel earn from $20,000 to just over $30,000 per year).
109. U.S. Census Bureau, Small Area Income & Poverty Estimates for States and Counties (2003) (Montana median household income reported at $34,449; national median reported at $43,418).
110. Fox & Mierzwinski, supra n. 29, at 6.
111. CFSA, Analysis of the Payday Advance Industry 19, 21-22, 30 (2001).
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so financially detrimental that consumers are better off without
them.
Lenders also point to the low number of complaints received
by state regulatory agencies as evidence the loans are not as problematic as consumer advocates claim. 112 However, the low numbers of complaints received by state lending regulators does not
mean the loans are problem-free. Borrowers may not know where
to complain, and may not be sufficiently aware of applicable lending laws to know whether their rights were violated. Some borrowers are hesitant to seek help because of the stigma attached to
admitting financial problems. In addition, many of the most problematic characteristics of the loans are currently legal under state
laws, and thus do not form the basis for a complaint.
Regardless, consumers are complaining, just not to the Division of Banking. They complain to social workers, credit counselors, housing agencies, and other social services. A fifty-two year
old Billings man seeking assistance from a social service agency
wrote,
Once you get locked in to those places it's extremely hard to get out
of them. It took my whole Social Security check each month to pay
them which left me with nothing so I had to go back to them every
month so I could pay my rent and household expenses. The ones
1 13
mostly using these places are the ones who can afford it the least.

A husband and wife from Kalispell who needed emergency housing assistance wrote,
We were told that the loan would be due in two weeks .

.. .tihe

payday lender cashed our check after holding it for only a week. We
do not know how they did this, but ... when our landlord went to
cash our rent check, it would not clear because there wasn't enough
money left in the account. Instead, our family was evicted ... [w]e
found ourselves homeless .... 114

A registered nurse from Missoula who took out a payday loan
to cover expenses after an injury wrote,
[Playday came around again and I didn't have the money to cover
expenses plus the loan with interest ...

so I decided to get another

loan. I was so nervous that they wouldn't give one to me if they
knew I had one already [but] the next service didn't ask, they simply handed me another $300. I ended up with 7 payday loans equaling.

..

[over] $900 a month in interest ...

I am drowning. I feel

humiliated and devastated by this situation. I am working on pay112. Id. at 29.
113. Letter on file with Author.
114. Letter on file with Author.
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ing each loan down $50 each payday .. . I think I have paid over
$6,000 in interest on these loans. 1 15

The loans negatively affect not only individual consumers, but
extend to entire communities and the taxpayer as well. 116 When
borrowers become trapped in a cycle of expensive loan renewals,
society foots the bill in several ways. Borrowers who use highinterest loans are more likely to prioritize payment of those loans,
meaning they will generally be paid before low- or no-interest
loans, utilities, or rent. 1 17 The loans also discourage savings, both
by providing a seemingly easy solution in case of emergency, and
by reducing borrowers' disposable income that could otherwise be
put into savings.""' Lack of savings in turn requires society to
subsidize services that the individual could otherwise pay for, like
retirement, education, and health care. 1 9
Rising levels of consumer debt have contributed to increasing
consumer bankruptcies, which deprive legitimate creditors of payment while requiring taxpayers to pay for the increased administrative costs incurred when lenders and debtors seek judicial resolution of their debts.' 20 In 2005, Congress attempted to address
this problem by passing the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA), which imposes financial
counseling requirements on debtors who wish to file for bankruptcy, and requires those earning more than their state's median
income to file under a Chapter 13 repayment plan. 12 1 However,
for many payday and title loan customers, the new law does not
affect their ability to file for bankruptcy at all, other than the
counseling requirement. Under BAPCPA, debtors earning less
than their state's median income may still wipe out their consumer debts through a Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
Predatory payday and title loans also undermine public assistance and income tax refund programs by trapping the borrower
in high-cost debt and diverting part or all of the taxpayer-funded
benefit away from the intended recipient, directly into the lender's
115. Letter on file with Author.
116. Diane Hellwig, Student Author, Exposing the Loansharks in Sheep's Clothing: Why
Re-Regulating the Consumer Credit Market Makes Economic Sense, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev.
1567, 1578 (2004-2005) (arguing government should increase regulation of the consumer
credit market to prevent society from bearing the burden of inefficient decision-making and
resource allocation by individual consumers).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1580.
120. Id. at 1579.
121. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
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pocket. In return, the individual receives only a small temporary
benefit, if any, and society as a whole receives a reduced benefit
for the money it has invested in state and federal programs like
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families and the Earned Income
122
Tax Credit.
Finally, struggling borrowers rely heavily on community services to stay afloat. While official complaints against payday and
title lenders may be few, beneath the radar their customers turn
to social service organizations to provide assistance with food,
clothing, rent, and mortgage payments. Anecdotal evidence suggests payday and title loan customers express a strong sense of
obligation to repay those debts, to the extent they would rather
seek assistance from social services than renege on their agreements with the lenders. 1 23 However, service-providing non-profits
generally survive on a hard-won mixture of funding from state
and federal government and charitable organizations, sources of
funding that largely originate in the taxpayer's pocket. Whether
we like it or not, the strain caused by predatory lending has a ripple effect that spreads through the entire community.
In August 2003, community development and social service
agencies around Montana perceived a growing problem in the
number of clients they were serving who were struggling with
predatory loans, including payday and title loans. In response,
the agencies convened the Montana Alliance for Responsible Finance (MARF), which has grown to seventeen organizations
across the state. 124 MARF adopted a three-pronged approach for
122. Cf. Hellwig, supra n. 116, at 1580.
123. For example, in 2003, an elderly couple came into the non-profit office where the
author provided foreclosure prevention assistance. While going through their monthly expenses, they reported that they were paying $300 per month to a payday lender. When the
author offered to contact the lender to request an extended repayment plan, as was routine

for homeowners in foreclosure, the couple dismissed the suggestion, saying, "They are always nice to us. It's the mortgage company that calls us and harasses us." The couple was
four months delinquent on their mortgage payment. They ended up signing their home

back over to the lender in a last ditch "deed-in-lieu" transaction to avoid foreclosure. To the
author's knowledge, they never missed a payment to the payday lender.
124. Members include AARP, Beartooth Rural Conservation and Development, Inc.,
Billings Community Housing Resource Board, Consumer Credit Counseling Service of
Montana, Family Service, Inc., Helena Area Housing Task Force, homeWORD, Montana
Credit Unions for Community Development, Montana Fair Housing, Montana Homeowner-

ship Network, Montana Legal Services Association, Montana Women Vote, Neighborhood
Housing Services of Great Falls, North Central Montana Rural Conservation and Development Area, Inc., Women's Opportunity and Resource Development (WORD), Working for

Equality and Economic Development (WEEL), and YWCAs of Montana. Points of Interest
(newsltr. of MARF) 1 (Summer 2005) (copy on file with Montana Law Review).
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addressing predatory lending practices in Montana: (1) provide
consumer education and outreach to raise public awareness regarding the dangers of predatory lending; (2) develop and promote
affordable community-based alternatives; and (3) increase the effectiveness of state lending laws to better protect consumers from
125
predatory lending practices.
While this Comment focuses on legislative recommendations,
changing existing laws alone is not sufficient. Consumers need
affordable options for short-term credit. Mainstream financial institutions like banks and credit unions use underwriting criteria
that pose several barriers for many borrowers, including the ability to pass a credit check, maintain an open account, and most
importantly, repay the loan.126 While these barriers are intended
to minimize losses rather than shut anyone out of the financial
services market, they nonetheless deny credit to borrowers with
lower incomes and credit problems. 12 7 For better or worse, payday
128
and title lenders have stepped in to fill the void.
Consumer advocates argue that traditional financial institutions like banks and credit unions must develop and offer their
own versions of payday and title loans in order to increase consumer choices and drive finance fees down. 12 9 Competition from
larger lenders is essential because increased competition between
payday and title lenders has had little effect on loan fees. 13o Economists predicted that as numbers of payday and title lenders increased, interest rates charged for these services would fall, but
they have not. 13 1 Real competition in the industry from mainstream lenders may reduce interest rates to a level that is profita13 2
ble for lenders and affordable for borrowers.
Both nationally and in Montana, credit unions have increasingly stepped up to the plate by developing affordable alternative
loan products for their members. 133 For example, Montana Credit
125. MARF Objectives, Points of Interest (newsltr. of MARF) 4 (Summer 2005).
126. E.g. generally Barr, supra n. 23.
127. Id. at 124.
128. Id.
129. Chin, supra n. 19, at 740-41.
130. Id.; Chessin, supra n. 5, at 408-09.
131. Chin, supra n. 19, at 741.
132. Michael Bertics, Fixing Payday Lending: The Potential of Greater Bank Involvement, 9 N.C. Banking Inst. 133, 134 (2005) (arguing payday lenders are collecting "economic rent" and banks' entry into the market would create a new equilibrium that would
extinguish that rent).
133. Colleen Kelly, Credit Union National Association, CUNA's Alternatives to Payday
Lending Task Force 3-4 (available at http'//www.cuna.org/download/alternativeshand-
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Unions for Community Development has developed an affordable
small-loan product to be offered through credit unions, which is
34
being piloted in the Helena area.'
Consumers also need basic financial skills so they may effectively manage their finances and evaluate their credit options.
The Montana Financial Education Coalition (MFEC), an organization dedicated to promoting financial health for Montanans of all
ages through personal financial education, incorporated in
2005.135 MFEC-affiliated organizations across the state, including several MARF members, have implemented regular financial
education programs aimed at teaching the knowledge and skills
necessary for personal financial health. Most of these organizations use nationally recognized financial education curricula, all of
which include modules on the dangers of high-interest loan prod36
ucts like payday and title loans.'
Finally, community service providers need a better understanding of payday and title loans in order to help their struggling
clients. Communities were somewhat blind-sided by the rapid appearance of payday and title lenders offering relatively new financial products with ramifications which are not yet well understood
by consumers or the general public. In 2005, MARF provided
statewide training for service providers concerning how to help clients struggling with payday and title loans.' 37 Over 100 individu38
als from twenty Montana communities attended.
Consumer advocates in Montana have made headway in developing alternative small-loan products and raising the awareness of consumers and communities regarding the pitfalls of predatory lending. However, stronger state regulations are necessary
to prevent consumers from becoming trapped in predatory loans
in the first place.
book_3rd-printing.pdf) (accessed Feb. 23 2007); Sue Kirchhoff, Managing Your Money,
Breaking the Cycle of Payday Loan "Trap", USA Today B1 (Sept. 20, 2006).
134. E-mail from Jeanne Saarinen, Exec. Dir., Mont. Credit Unions for Community
Dev., to Author (Oct. 18, 2006) (copy on file with Montana Law Review).
135. Mont. Fin. Educ. Coalition, About Us, http://www.mtmfec.org/aboutus.asp (accessed
Feb. 23, 2007).
136. E.g. FDIC, Money Smart, http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/consumer/moneysmartt
overview.html (accessed Feb. 23, 2007); NeighborWorks Am., Financial Fitness, http://
www.nw.org/network/neighborworksprogs/financialfitness/default.asp (accessed Feb. 23,
2007).
137. MARF, Caught in the Trap: How to Help Clients Struggling with Payday and Title
Loans (Aug. 2005) (workshops provided by Consumer Credit Counseling Serv. of Mont.,
Mont. Legal Serv. Assn., and homeWORD).
138. Registration records on file with Author.
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THE FINAL PIECE OF THE SOLUTION:
LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS

The Montana State Legislature has the opportunity and the
responsibility to enact state laws that protect consumers from
predatory payday and title lending practices. The payday and title lending industries lobbied aggressively to get laws on the books
that look like regulation but actually do little more than legalize
loan sharking. 13 9 Now state legislators need to revisit the key
consumer protection provisions that consumer advocates have
consistently argued are necessary to adequately protect borrowers.
At the national level, Congress recently enacted most of these
provisions for all enlisted military personnel to protect service
members and their families from the most abusive of the lenders'
practices. 140 Although the Montana Attorney General's office and
consumer advocates introduced similar legislation at the 2007 legislative session,' 4 ' the legislature has yet to extend these basic
protections to all Montana borrowers. 4 2 The following provisions
would ensure that the DDLA and TLA actually serve their stated
purpose of protecting consumers.
Cap fees at an annualpercentage rate of 36%. Regardless of how
serious a borrower's financial crisis is, desperation cannot justify
an APR of 300% for a title loan, or 650% for a payday loan. In fact,
the greater a borrower's financial need, the less likely he will be
able to repay such an expensive form of credit. Loans that actually worsen a borrower's financial situation do not benefit anyone
except the lender.
The lenders acknowledge that their loans are more expensive
than traditional forms of consumer finance, but argue that for the
occasional borrower, the loan is a welcome alternative to the fees
139. Supra nf. 25, 37 and accompanying text.
140. Supra n. 105 and accompanying text.
141. Recommendations adapted from draft legislation prepared by the author for the
Montana Attorney General's Office in 2006 and based on model legislation prepared by
NCLC (Model Deferred Deposit Loan Act, supra n. 33).
142. As of February 23, 2007, the 2007 Montana Legislature had tabled two bills attempting to cap payday and title loan interest rates. HB 29, which included many of the
consumer protection provisions recommended in this Comment, was tabled in the House
Business and Labor Committee on January 19, 2007. A narrower Senate bill, SB 455, attempted only to cap the interest rates at 36% per year and was tabled in the Senate Business, Labor, and Economic Affairs Committee on Feb. 21, 2007.
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charged for returned checks and late payments. 143 In support of
this argument, the industry cites statistics showing that 70% to
as
80% of customers take out about one loan per month or less,
144
"responsibly."
loans
the
use
proof that most of its customers
Not only does such an argument imply the loans are an inherently dangerous product that must be used "responsibly," it is far
from clear how monthly use of a loan product with a triple-digit
interest rate is "responsible." Payday and title lenders actually
advertise heavily that their loans will enable borrowers to take
vacations with their friends, pamper themselves, or splurge on
gifts or other purchases. 145 The lenders encourage instant gratification in their advertising, then turn around and insist to legislators that they are providing a critical service to borrowers who
may not otherwise be able to obtain "emergency" credit. Whether
the loans are for impulse purchases or basic necessities, the fact
remains that too many borrowers find that the loans are not a
one-time stopgap measure. Rather, they become a revolving door
of debt, a situation upon which a large percentage of the lenders'
46
profits depends.'
Lenders also argue that the risks associated with payday and
title loans are far greater than those associated with traditional
loan products, and thus justify the much higher interest rates
charged. 47 However, the industry's justification of higher fees
based on higher expenses and risks does not hold up to available
statistics. In a Colorado study, payday lenders reported an average charge-off rate of 3.34% of total loans between 1996 and
2004.148 During the same period, the Federal Reserve reported an
average charge-off rate of 5.15% for credit cards and 2.69% for all
consumer loans.' 4 9 The industry reports gross margins of 30% to

143. CFSA, Myths vs. Reality of Payday Loans, http'//www.cfsa.net/mythvs-reality.
html#2 (accessed Feb. 23, 2007).
144. Id.
145. E.g. Golden Title Loan, Advertisement, Missoula Indep. "Fresh Facts" (Fall 2006) (a
publication targeting new and returning university students, offering to "pamper your wallet" to allow a "weekend getaway").
146. Barr, supra n. 23, at 157.
147. Chessin, supra n. 5, at 408.
148. Id.
149. Fed. Reserve Bd., Statistics:Releases and Historical Data, Charge-Offand Delinquency Rates on Loans and Leases at Commercial Banks (Seasonally Adjusted), http://
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/chargeoff/chgallsa.htm (accessed Feb. 23, 2007).
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45% of revenue (approximately three times that of banks) and average returns on capital exceeding 24%.150
In addition, a majority of profits come from "rollover" fees, or
back-to-back transactions, 15 1 which many payday loan borrowers
use frequently. 15 2 If the lenders do most of their business with
repeat customers who have an established history of repaying
their loans, the risk of default may not be as high as the lenders
claim. Either way, payday and title lenders have yet to produce
data that justifies charging consumers ten to twenty times the
rates other consumer lenders must follow.
Require lenders to disclose fees as an APR. TILA requires lenders
to disclose their total loan cost as an APR, and the act applies to
payday and title lenders. 15 3 While the TLA currently requires disclosure of APR, the DDLA does not. Both acts must expressly require such disclosure to dispel any misperception that TILA does
not apply to payday lenders just because it is not mentioned in the
DDLA.
Payday and title lenders insist that their finance fees must be
viewed in the context of an extremely short-term loan that is only
intended for emergency purposes. They argue that converting the
fee to an annual interest rate or an APR is unfair as it does not
accurately reflect the brief nature of the loan product.
However, consumer advocates have insisted from the beginning that lenders are required to disclose loan costs using an APR,
as mandated under TILA. 154 Indeed, the point of TILA's
mandatory APR disclosure is to allow consumers to compare different credit options using similar terms. 155 Because the disclosures are clearly already required under federal law, adding a
similar provision to Montana's payday and title lending acts will
simply foreclose any arguments of non-applicability and increase
the likelihood of consumers receiving the information they need to
make informed comparisons of credit costs.
150. Barr, supra n. 23, at 150; Daniel A. Edelman, Testimony Regarding Payday and
Title Loans, http://www.edcombs.com/CM/News/news20.asp (accessed Feb. 23, 2007) (citing
studies showing payday lender returns on capital between 30% to 40%, or about three
times the returns received by banks).
151. Barr, supra n. 23, at 157.
152. Infra nn. 156-57.
153. Supra an. 92-93 and accompanying text.
154. Supra n. 95.
155. See supra n. 91 and accompanying text.
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Prohibit back-to-back transactions. The "revolving door" nature
of payday loans is one of their worst features. As noted earlier,
lenders earn most of their profits from "rollover" fees, or back-toback transactions. 156 An Illinois study showed that payday loan
borrowers used a median of over ten loans in two years, with 20%
of borrowers using twenty or more loans in that time. A Wisconsin study found that over half of payday loan borrowers took out
eleven or more loans in one year. In Indiana, 77% of all payday
loan transactions were rollovers, and borrowers averaged ten payday loans per year.157

Payday and title lenders characterize the loans as an occasional credit option that is not to be used for long-term financial
needs. A mandatory "cooling off' period prohibiting lenders from
making a loan to a customer within seven days after the customer
paid off her most recent loan will ensure the loans are used in a
manner that is consistent with the lenders' intent.
Require considerationof borrowers'ability to repay. If a borrower
has insufficient income to both repay the loan and meet his regular living expenses, extending the loan is not helping him-it is
setting him up for failure. Payday and title lenders generally
forego traditional underwriting requirements, which is one of the
primary advantages a payday or title loan presents for a borrower
with poor credit. However, minimal safeguards are necessary to
avoid extending credit that cannot realistically be repaid and only
creates further financial difficulty for the borrower. Thus, a loan
should be limited to no more than 25% of the borrower's gross
monthly income during the repayment term.
Require lenders to accept partial payments. Montana law does
not currently require payday and title lenders to accept any partial payments toward the principal of a borrower's loan. Thus,
many lenders refuse any payment less than the full amount owed.
This prevents the borrower from paying down the principal as she
is able to do so, and increases the likelihood that she will be unable to repay the loan when it is due. Model legislation from NCLC
recommends borrowers be allowed to make minimum payments of
at least $5 toward the principal of their loans at any time.158
156. Barr, supra n. 23, at 157.
157. Id. at 156.
158. Model Deferred Deposit Loan Act §§ 6(b) (NCLC & CFA 1998) (available at http:l!
www.consumerlaw.org/initiatives/paydayjoans/paydayac.shtml).
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Require lenders to allow repaymentplans. Payday and title lenders advertise their loans as "easy money," but many borrowers
find that the loans are not such easy money, after all. A borrower
who cannot repay his or her payday or title loan currently faces
two choices: renew the loan by paying another finance fee, 159 or
face the consequences of a bounced check or repossessed vehicle.
Repeated payment of finance fees at an APR of 300% to 650% only
delays the borrower's ability to repay the principal and get out of
the loan. Rather than lock borrowers into a cycle of sky-high finance charges, the loans should provide reasonable repayment
provisions for borrowers who find themselves sinking under the
weight of the high-cost loans. If most borrowers use the loans
responsibly and in moderation, as lenders claim, this provision
should only affect a small percentage of borrowers who find themselves unable to repay the loans.
Prohibitlending to any borrower with an outstanding loan. If a
borrower is unable to repay a payday or title loan, or any loan for
that matter, taking out another loan is generally not the solution.
This is even more dangerous when the loans being stacked up
have APRs of 300% to 650%. Lenders in Montana currently rely
on voluntary borrower disclosure of any outstanding loans with
other lenders, if they inquire at all. Mandatory use of a database
system to track outstanding loans will assist lenders in assessing
a borrower's ability to repay, and protect the consumer from getting into serious financial trouble with multiple high-interest
loans.
Increase oversight and regulation. A lack of quantitative data regarding the use and impacts of payday and title loans poses a significant challenge in attempting to evaluate the effect of these
loans on Montana consumers. National statistics are both widely
available and very helpful. These studies often focus on impacts
to lower income households and minority groups like African
Americans and Hispanics. However, Indians, Montana's largest
minority population, are largely absent from national studies, and
Montana's per capita income trails behind the national average.
Thus, Montana must take the initiative to ensure sufficient data
159. In the case of a payday loan, the lender is technically prohibited from renewing the
loan or allowing a borrower to repay a loan with the proceeds of another loan, but back-toback transactions are common and have the same effect as a renewal. Supra n. 52 and
accompanying text.
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collection to evaluate the impact payday and title loans have on
Montana consumers.
To date, a handful of states have taken similar measures, in
160
the form of a mandatory lender database as described above.
While one of the primary purposes of the database is to prevent
lending to borrowers who already have outstanding loans from
other lenders, it also allows state regulators to collect a wealth of
information regarding who really uses these loans, and how.
The fiscal burden for such a system falls not on the state, but
is spread out on the industries being regulated through a small fee
per transaction. There is little room for lenders to pass the fee
along to customers by raising their finance charges, because at
some point the lenders run up against the proposed 36% APR cap
and must simply absorb the database fee.
Until sufficient quantitative data exist to allow meaningful
analysis of the loans, the debate between the lenders and consumer advocates will continue, often based on anecdotal evidence,
with no satisfactory answers in sight. Montana should follow Indiana's example and require, through its Division of Banking, the
collection and evaluation of payday and title loan data to shed
light on questions like who uses these loans, and how, and
whether they actually benefit borrowers. Such oversight is essential for the Division of Banking to fulfill its stated mission of pro16 1
tecting Montana consumers.
Close the pawnbroker loophole. Finally, if Montana's title loan
laws are to be effective, they must apply to all lenders extending
title loans. The TLA currently specifies that it does not apply to
pawnbrokers, 62 which has led to various interpretations. Some
title lenders interpret this provision to mean that if they instead
call their loans "title pawns," the TLA does not apply to them.
Pawnbrokers have interpreted it to mean they can offer title
63
loans, but are not required to comply with the TLA.'
Consumer advocates argue that the legislature intended to
differentiate between title loans, where the borrower leaves a vehicle's title with the lender but keeps the vehicle, from a vehicle
160. Florida, Indiana, and Oklahoma have enacted laws requiring lenders to report to
statewide databases. Fla. Stat. § 33-560.404(19) (2006); Ind. Code § 24-4.5-7-404 (2006);
Okla. Stat. tit. 59, § 3109(B) (2006).
161. Mont. Div. of Banking and Fin. Instn., Mission, http://banking.mt.gov/#2 (accessed
Feb. 23, 2007).
162. Mont. Code Ann. § 31-1-802(3) (2005).
163. Barr, supra n. 23, at 165.
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pawn, where the borrower leaves the vehicle at the pawn shop.
The TLA should apply to all loans secured by a vehicle's title when
the borrower keeps the vehicle, regardless of who gives the loan or
what they call it.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Borrowers need options to meet short-term credit needs.
However, options that charge APRs of 300% to 650% only worsen
the borrower's financial plight in the long run, and in turn increase burdens on local social services and taxpayers. An industry
that collects excessive profits to the detriment of its customers and
the community in which it operates is a negative participant in
the local and state economy, and should be regulated with aims of
deterring its exploitation of unwary consumers and mitigating its
negative social impacts. A long-term solution requires collaborative efforts to increase consumer awareness and education, offer
reasonably priced credit options, and regulate payday and title
lending to protect the long-term financial wellbeing of Montana
consumers.
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